Last week, the Ohio Supreme Court unfortunately narrowed the scope of coverage for a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship. The court held in Ohio Northern University v. Charles Construction Services, Inc. that faulty workmanship in a construction defect case is not an “occurrence” under standard-form CGL policies in Ohio. The circumstances will sound familiar to anyone involved in the construction industry: Ohio Northern University retained Charles Construction to build a hotel and conference center on campus. The contract required Charles to maintain a CGL policy with Products-Completed Operations-Hazard coverage. Charles obtained a policy from Cincinnati Insurance Company with the required coverage.
A federal court in Michigan just breathed new life into a long-running legal saga—while at the same time issuing a warning shot across the bows of insurers—by declining to dismiss an insured’s bad faith cause of action alleging its insurer wrongly decided to pay one claim before another, to the insured’s detriment.
As the old adage goes, “the devil is in the details.” Insurance policy terms do not always apply in ways that policyholders expect. For this reason, it is imperative to understand how coverages, definitions and exclusions work together to avoid surprise gaps in coverage. The Fifth Circuit found a coverage gap in a recent case holding that settlement contributions from co-defendants met an excess policy’s broad definition of “Other Insurance,” preventing the policyholder from securing coverage for a significant part of its losses.
The conflict between policyholders and insurers over “long-tail” insurance coverage took an unfortunate turn with a recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals on the issue of allocation for long-tail claims. On March 27, 2018, the court issued a decision in Keyspan that significantly impacts policyholders by decreasing the insurers’ proportionate share of financial responsibility and increasing the share imposed on the insured. This case involved long-term and continuous environmental contamination that began before comprehensive general liability insurance became available in the marketplace and continued, unobserved, across multiple policy periods. At issue was whether, under the “pro rata time-on-the-risk” method of allocation, Century Indemnity Company was liable to its insured, KeySpan Gas East Corporation, for years outside of its policy periods when there was no applicable insurance coverage offered on the market.
A little over two months ago, we analyzed the recent decision in Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Insurance (UK) Ltd., which placed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in line with a consistently expanding number of jurisdictions finding that a subcontractor’s faulty work constitutes an “occurrence” (defined as an accident) under standard form CGL language. The Tenth Circuit’s decision emphasized the “near unanimity” of state supreme court decisions since 2012 finding that construction defects constituted an occurrence (for example, New Jersey). Days after publishing our post on the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court faced the same question. But rather than join the growing trend, the Kentucky court doubled down on its previous decision addressing the issue, finding for a second time since 2010 that a contractor’s faulty workmanship was not an “occurrence” under a CGL policy.
By statute, California law holds that willful misconduct—where an insured intends to cause someone harm—is not insurable as a matter of public policy. For years, insurance companies have sought to expand this prohibition to exclude coverage where anyone acts deliberately, regardless of the intent of the insured, or the insured’s intent to cause harm.
Insurance agreement language that precludes coverage in CGL policies for “expected or intended” injuries has been analyzed in nearly every jurisdiction, and courts have consistently held that bodily injury or property damage is excluded only if the insurer can demonstrate resulting damage was expected or intended by the insured. In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Connex Railroad LLC, an insurer-friendly variation of these provisions was called into question in possibly the worst texting and driving scenario imaginable. Still, a California Court of Appeal applying New York law refused to bar coverage.
Living a life in 0.1 hour increments! Most law firm lawyers begrudgingly accept the necessity of meticulously counting their time, and most in-house lawyers are relieved when they no longer have to think about their days six minutes at a time. But as more in-house legal departments take on their company’s own defense, they are well advised to have time-keeping programs and procedures in place to recover the maximum amount from the insurance companies that have accepted a duty to defend or agreed to indemnify the company for defense costs.
It’s that time of the year when Americans gather together, enjoy a feast, and fall asleep in front of the TV. But before the tryptophan kicks in, we also like to give thanks for the good things that have happened in the past year. Corporate policyholders can share in the tradition, as this year has produced a number of court decisions that favored insureds and protected their coverage expectations. Here are a few of the cases we are most thankful for:
This case out of the South Carolina Supreme Court gave generously to policyholders in a number of ways this year (giving us the opportunity to post in this blog again and again and again). The case involved defective construction claims against a developer. The developer’s insurer, Harleysville, provided a defense under a vague reservation of rights letter. After the underlying plaintiffs were awarded verdicts against the developer, Harleysville sued to avoid covering the judgments. The court ruled against Harleysville on four issues:
- Harleysville’s vague, general reservation of rights letter did not effectively reserve its rights to contest coverage under the terms and exclusions in the policy;
- Where the underlying verdicts did not apportion the damages between covered and uncovered losses, the insurer bore the burden of proving amounts allocable to uncovered losses. Where the insurer failed to meet that burden, it had to cover the entire verdict;
- Punitive damages awarded in the verdicts were found to be covered under Harleysville’s policy; and
- The owners’ association, which was asserting the dissolved developer’s coverage rights in the case, had standing to challenge the insurer’s reservation of rights letter.
Harleysville is a case that just keeps on giving.
The duty to provide a defense, or reimburse defense costs, is one of the most important features of liability insurance. You could say it’s the stuffing, where indemnity is the turkey. The Delaware Superior Court emphasized that obligation in Verizon to the tune of $48 million in defense costs that the insurer had refused to pay. This decision was important because it rejected the insurer’s attempt to define the vague term “securities claim” narrowly to avoid its obligation to pay defense costs. More broadly, the court upheld the pro-policyholder interpretative doctrine of contra proferentem, rejecting the insurer’s argument that the doctrine should not apply where the insured is a large, sophisticated corporation. Applying the doctrine, the court held that unless it can be shown that the insured had a hand in drafting the policy language, ambiguous terms should be interpreted against the insurer. A more detailed analysis of the decision by this firm can be found here.
Thanksgiving dinner is always better with more guests. Additional Insured endorsements in policies extend the invitation to more parties that may require a seat at the table of insurance protection. This is especially important in the construction context, where developers and general contractors rely on numerous subcontractors’ insurance policies to protect them from liability arising from those subcontractors’ work. These two decisions rejected insurers’ attempts to narrow the application of additional insured endorsements.
In All State Interior, previously highlighted here, a New York County trial court interpreted an endorsement broadly, granting additional insured status to companies that didn’t technically contract with the subcontractor, and who weren’t named in the endorsement. The court, in essence, incorporated the terms of the contract between All State and the subcontractor into the endorsement to trigger additional insured coverage for the project owner, site lessor, and construction manager as All State’s “partners, directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives.”
In McMillin, the insurer’s policy granted additional insured status to McMillin, the general contractor of a project, for “liability arising out of [the subcontractor’s] ongoing operations,” and excluded additional insured status for the insured’s completed operations. The insurer denied defense coverage on the basis that the subcontractor had finished working on the project. The California Court of Appeal disagreed, stating that the endorsement’s phrase “arising out of” is broader than “during,” and so the liability did not have to arise while the insured was still working on the project.
When it’s time for dessert, allocating the available pie to make sure everyone gets what they deserve can be tricky. This year, Missouri joined the ranks of “all sums” states that maximize coverage for policyholders with long-tail claims stretching over several years. The “all sums” method of allocation allows an insured to allocate all of its damages from long-tail losses to a single year of coverage. This ruling by the Missouri Court of Appeals was based on the plain language of the policies, which promise to indemnify the insured for all sums the insured is legally obligated to pay for occurrences during the policy period. The court also ruled that all triggered primary policies across a period of years need not be exhausted before excess policies in the period selected by the policyholder can be triggered. The court ruled that only the primary policy in one year needs to be exhausted before that year’s excess policies are triggered. For a more thorough analysis of this case, click here.
Rather than brave the stampedes of Black Friday, one can get good deals on holiday gifts on Cyber Monday. But to protect against cyber thieves, make sure your insurance coverage will protect you. In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York interpreted the computer fraud provision of a crime policy to do just that. Policyholder Medidata was the victim of fraud when someone tricked its employees into wiring money overseas, using spoofed emails that looked like they came from the company’s president. Medidata’s insurer denied its claim, stating that the computer fraud clause of the crime coverage required actual hacking into and manipulation of Medidata’s computer system. But the court sided with Medidata, ruling that the spoofing of emails violated the integrity of the insured’s computer system enough to trigger coverage, and actual entry by hackers was not required by the policy language or by precedent.
We at Pillsbury hope you all had a very Happy Thanksgiving!
What happens when you have a claim arising from circumstances that unfolded over many policy years—like environmental property damage or asbestos bodily injury claims? Which policies are triggered? How much coverage does each policy provide? Unsurprisingly, insurers and policyholders disagree on the answers. And courts across the country have been grappling with the issue for decades.
Some courts apply the “all sums” approach, which allows a policyholder to recover in full—subject to policy limits—from any insurer whose policy has been “triggered.” Other courts apply the “pro rata” approach, under which each triggered insurer must pay only a portion of the loss allocated to its policy periods. This is a closely watched issue among the insurance bar as it can dramatically impact the amount of a recovery depending on the contours of the policyholder’s insurance program.